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[L. A. No. 20686. In Bank. Aug. 4, 1950.]

JACK STANLEY, Respondent, v. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Literary Property-Remedies-Recovery on Implied.Contract.
-The originator of an idea may recover on an implied contract from one who uses or infringes it where the idea was
novel and reduced te, concrete form prior to its appropriation
by defendant, and where disclosure of the idea by the originator to the appropriator took place under circumstances
indirating that compensation was expected if the idea was
used.
[2] Id.-8imilarity or Identity of Compositions.-The problem of
similarity between two compositions, whether literary, musicalor dramatic, is a question of fact to be determined ultimately by a comparison of the two works on the basis of the
opinion of the average individual possessing a praetieal understuuJlIIg of the subject.
[3] Id.-Common Law Rights and Statutory CopJrights.-ComlUon law rights in literary property are generally limited to
unpublished works and are of a wider and more exclusive
nature than the rights conferred by statutory copyrights in
published works. The common law prohibits any kind of
unauthorized interference with or use of an unpublished
work, while a statutory copyright permits a fair use of the
copyright publication without deeming it an infringement.
[4] Id.-Infringement-Tests.-The test in determining whether
there has been an infringement of a literary work is the
impression received by the average reasonable man OD a comparative reading of that work and the alleged infringing work,
and not by a dissection of sentences and incidents.
[6] Id. - Infringement - Copying. - In determining whether the
similarity which exists between a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work and an alleged infringing pUblication
is due to copying, the common knowledge of the average
reader, observer, spectator or listener is the standard of
judgment which must be used.
[Sa, 6b] Id. - Remedies - Evidence.-ln an aetion by a writer
against a broadcasting company to retover OD an implied agreement. of th.. company to pay the writer for a radio progr~
[1] Sec 16 Cal.Jur. 665; 3.,l Am.Jur. 472.
McK. Dig. References: [1-11] Literary Property; (12] Damages,
§ 188 j [13) New Trial, § 71 (5).
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allegedly originated by him, sufficient similarity between the
writer's proposed program and that given by the eompany
was shown to justify an implied finding of the jury that the
company appropriated the program idea, where both programs
were entitled "Hollywood Preview," and both, with slight
variations, sought public approval in the selection of stories
and stars for motion picture production, .with emphasis on
audience participation or o1Ier of prizes.
[7] ld.-Remedies-Evidence.-In an action by a writer against
a broadcasting company to recover on an implied agreement
of the company to pay the writer for a radio program allegedly originated by him, the evidence was sufficient to show
that the company had access to the writer's program idea
where it appeared that he submitted his program to several
officials and employees of the company at di1Ierent times prior
to its use by the company.
[8] ld.-Subject Matter-Originality.-Although there is nothing
new in a play broadcast over the air, nor in the use of the
words "Hollywood Preview" in connection with the first showing to the public of a motion picture, nor in audience participation in the broadcast, the cOlllbination of all of these
elements to make one idea for a radio program is new and
novel so as to be entitled to protection against its unauthorized use by a person other than the originator.
[S] ld.-Subject Matter-Orlginality.-An author who takes existing materials from sources C01lllIlon to all writers, arranges
and combines them in a new form, giving them an application unknown before, is entitled to a copyright, notwithstanding the fact that he may have borrowed much of his materials
and ideas from others, provided they are assembled in a
different manner and combined for a di1Ierent purpose, and
his plan and arrangement are a real improvement on existing
modes.
[10] ld.-Subject Matter-Originality.-The question of originality of a radio program alleged to have been infringed is not
one of law to be determined by the court, but is one of fact
for the jury's determination where there is a conflict of evidence as to whether this program is similar to that of an
alleged infringing program.
[11] ld.-Publication.-The making of an audition recording of
a writer's proposed radio program before an audience in a
broadcasting company's studio is not making his idaa "public
property" within the menning of the law, but amounts to a
limited or restricted pUblication as distinguished from a general publication.
[12] Damages-Evidence.-In an action by a writer against a
broadcasting company to recover on an implied agreement of
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the company to pay the writer for a radio program allegedly
originated by him, an award of $35,000 was supported by
evidence that he had spent several years in the preparation
of his idea for a radio program, that he had a recording n:ade
of it when an audition was held which entailed the employment of various actors and technicians, and that the idea was
of no value after its use by the company, and where both the
writer and his expert witness testified as to the estimated
worth of the program idea, and as to the custom in the industry to pay the author a certain percentage of production costs
based on the number of weeks a show was on the air.
[IS] New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence-Discretion of 'i'rial
Oourt.-In an action by a writer against a broadcasting company to recover on an implied agreement of the company to
pay the writer for a radio program allegedly originated· by
him, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the company's
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence that the idea for the radio program had originated
with a third person, where the idea as presented by such person contained no element of audience participation or offer
of prizes as was contained in the radio program that was
used, and where affidavits filed in opposition to the motion
presented the same conflict as the evidence adduced at the
trial.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by writer against broadcasting compaJiy to recover'
on an implied agreement of company to pay writer for a
radio program allegedly originated by him. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
O'Melveny & Myers, Homer I. Mitchell, W. B. Carman, Jr ..
Louis W. Myers and Deane F. Johnson for Appellant.
Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin, Amici Curiae on behalf
of Appellant.
.
Harold A. Fendler and John W. Preston for Respondent.
CARTER. .J .-Defendnnt bas appealt'd from a verdict and
judgment for $35.000 given by a jury in favor of the plaintiff.
The action was brought to recow'r on an alIt'ged implied agreemt'nt of defendant to pay plaintiff for a radio program which
plaintiff claims to have originated.
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In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that during the year
1941 he originated and caused to be prepared, composed and
written an original script for a radio program entitled
"Walter Wanger Presents" and a radio program format
entitled "Preview Parade" or "Hollywood Preview" amI
that about September 1st of that year he had this script recorded for the purpose of submitting it to prospective sponsors, advertising agencies and broadcasting companies. He
alleged that he, at all times, retained full ownership of the
radio program and that he at no time licensed or authorized
the use of it in any manner. Plaintiff further alleged that
during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 he submitted to the
defendant, Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated, the
radio program, script, format and records for the purpose of
having the defendant determine whether or not it desired to
purchase it or license the right to use it under an implied
agreement that if the defendant did use the radio program
it would pay plaintiff its reasonable value. But that on or
about the .first of May, 1945, the defendant produced and
presented a radio program entitled "Hollywood Preview"
which substantially copied and embodied plaintiff's radio
program and, as a result, became indebted to the plaintiff for
the use thereof.
On this appeal, defendant contends that the court should
have found, as a matter of law, that there was no similarity
between the two programs; that the evidence was insufficient to
show that defendant had access to plaintiff's program idea;
that there can be no implied agreement to pay for an abstract
idea which is not new or novel; that the jury arbitrarily
ignored the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of defendant's witness, Hudson; that when an idea is made public there
can be no liability for its use; that its motion for a new trial
on the grounds that (1) the jury's verdict for damages was so
excessive that it appeared to have been given under the influence of prejudice and passion, (2) newly discovered evidence; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict should have been granted.
[1] As a general observation from the cases, it may be
stated that the right of the originator of an idea to recover
from one who uses or infringes it seems to depend upon
whether or not the idea was novel and rednced to concrete form
prior to its appropriation by the defendant, and, where the
idea was disclosed by the originator to the appropriator,
whether such disclosure took place under circumstances indi-
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cating that compensation was expected if the idea was used.
Where these prerequi.sites exist, recovery may be had upon
a theory of contract implied in fact or in law. (Plus Promotions v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., (N.Y.) 49 F.Supp. 116; Alberts v.
Remington Rand, 175 Misc. 486 [23 N.Y.S.2d 892] ; Healey v.
R. H. Macy & Co., 251 App.Div. 440 [297 N.Y.S. 165], aff'd.
277 N.Y. 681 [14 N.E.2d 388).)
Plaintiff's complete program is as follows:
"Announcer: 'Ladies and gentlemen, WALTER WANGER
PRESENTS Hollywood Preview! Hol1ywood Preview! Hollywood Preview I
" 'And here is Hollywood's distinguished producer, Walter
Wanger.'
"Wanger: 'How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome
to our Hollywood Pre,iew Parade, a radio show designed for
your pleasure and to give you a voice in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in the months to come. Hollywood is
very interested in giving you motion pictures you want to
see. Unfortunately produeers do not and cannot always know
just what you do want. This is the reason for this "Pre'\"iew
Parade. " Eaeh week we plan to present a radio story we
think will make a good film. We ask you to send us your
opinion and suggest players for the leading roles. Our sponsor
will give worthwhile cash prizes for the best letters, but
more about that later.
" 'Now allow me to introduce Mr. True Boardman.'
"Boardman: 'This is the sixth program of the new series,
"Walter Wanger Presents." Your host is one of Hollywood's
most progressive film leaders, the President of the Academy
of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, and producer of such
outstanding films as Foreign Correspondent, Blockade, Long
Voyage Home, Stagecoach, Algiers, and currently Sundown.
" 'Eaeh week Mr. Wanger selects a story which he feels
should be made into a picture. You are asked to write to
Mr. Wanger and give him your opinion. The sponsors pay
$500 for the best letter written by one of our listeners and if
enough of you vote for it our play will be produced as a motion
picture.
" 'And now, once again, Walter Wanger.'
"Wanger: 'Thank you, Mr. Boardman. Tonight our play
is entitled "So Gallantly Gleaming." It has been written.by
Harvey Thew, Peter Ordway, and Sonya Levien. The radio
adaptation is by Hector Chevigny.
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" , "So Gallantly Gleaming" tells a thrilling and romantic
story of a great explorer, his beautiful wife, and the acquisition of California. Listen closely. Do you think it should be
made into a motion picture T Your votes will decide.
" 'Our guests who will later give their opinion are Miss
Joan Bennett, Hector Chevigny and Henry Hathaway. Music
is by Robert Armbruster.' "
DRAMA

"Boardman: 'Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Did you
like" So Gallantly Gleaming'" Would you like to see it as a
motion picture' The story of John Charles Fremont, I think,
is one that deserves retelling. In a moment we will hear the
opinion of our three Hollywood guests, Joan Bennett, Hector
Chevigny, and Henry Hathaway. and then have an opportunity to compare their opinions with yours.
" 'Now again a word as to the real idea behind this program. Each week Walter Wanger Presents brings you a
story which we think would be a good motion picture. And
here is your part in the program. We ask you to write to
Mr. Wanger, telling him whether or not you would like to
have this play madp into a motion picture, and why. Also
include your choice of stars to play the leading roles. The
best letter received each week will receive an award of $500
from our sponsor. The award is based not on the style of your
letter, not on brilliant writing. but entirely on the reasons you
set down as your opinion. And believe me, Hollywood is
waiting for your vote. Whether or not yon win a prize. your
vote will help decide whether or not to film "So Gallantly
Gleaming." The American picture-going public has long said
it wished a voice in the choice of stories presented on the
screen. Here is the chance for you to have that voice and
make it heard across the nation. Write your letter now
tonight. Address Walter Wanger, Hollywood, California.
"'Last week Mr. Wanger pre~pnted "Out of the Night,"
the sensational novel which has attracted such nationwide
comment. A storm of argument was aroused. Sixty-ei!!ht
thousand letters have been received to date. and we are
happy to announce that Warner Brothers Studio have
arranged to make this startling f;tory into a film in the near
future. So, thanks to yonr Iptters. you have helped' Warner
Brother~ to their ilecision to film "Ollt of the Night."
" 'Last week's best letter was from Mrs. William Wentworth
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of Brockton, Massachusetts. Congratulations, Mrs. Wentworth I
Your check for $500 goes forward immediately.
" 'Now, Mr. Wanger, I think we are all anxious to hear the
opinions of your guests about tonight's show.'
(Interview with Board of Experts)
"Wanger: 'Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank
you, Joan Bennett, Henry Hathaway, Hector Chevigny. Do
you ladies and gentlemen, agree with the opinions of our
guestsf Do you agree that "So Gallantly Gleaming" should
become a motion picture t And who do you think should play
the leading roles f Won't you write and tell us. Remember
that whether your letter is best and wins the prize or not, you
are helping Hollywood decide on what to give you on the
screen. Next week we will have something totally different for
you, a story called •• Two Arabian Knights." Until then, this
is Walter Wanger saying, Good night.'
" Announcer: •Walter Wanger Presents is brought to you at
this same time each week by our sponsor. Original music for
tonight's show was written and directed, as always, by Robert
Armbruster. The cast included Hollywood's outstanding radio
stars-Lurene Tuttle, Lou Crosby, Norman Field, Elliott
Lewis, Lou Merrill, Frederick Shields, Paul Whitley, Norene
Gamille, Gayne Whitman.
" 'This is John Hiestand hanging out the "Goodnight"
sign until we meet again next week at this same time. This is
the National Broadcasting Company.' "
The following is a portion of the broadcast preceding and
following the drama as actually put on the air by defendant:
" Announcer: 'It's The Flying Red Horse . . . the sign that
identifies the Mobilgas and MobiZoil dealers who bring you
. . . "HOLLYWOOD PREVlEW"· . . . with Mr. Otto Kruger!'
" Announcer: 'Tonight, on behalf of your Mobilgas and
Mobiloil dealer ... Mr. Otto Kruger, eminent star of radio,
stage and screen brings you another Hollywood Preview of a
motion picture of the future! Tonight's story . . • "Growing
Pains" . . . a comedy by Aurania Rouveral now scheduled
for production by RKO Pictures.
" 'And as our star . . . Miss Marcy Maguire I
" 'Now . . . ladies and gentlemen ... Otto Kruger!'
"Kruger: 'Thank you. Good evening, everyone. Well, it's
another Preview Night here in Hollywood, and Mobilgas invites you to share in the excitement. For just as the first
showing of a new motion picture in the film capitol means
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bright lights and eager crowds, 80 does the same spirit of
enthusiasm prevail on our radio version of Hollywood Preview.
So, tonight, it's "Growing Pains" . . . famous as a play
. . . and no,v being prepared for filming at RKO. And as our
star . . . well, because "Growing Pains" is a story about
irresistible youth, we wanted Hollywood's most enthusiastic,
effervescent young lady in the leading role of Terry. And we
found exactly that in the person of red-headed . . . Marcy
Maguire.'
"Announcer: 'And now, "Growing Pains" •. .'
" Announcer: 'So ends tonight's Hollywood Preview
Story.' "
(Interview with star follows.)
"Announcer: 'Now, as our theatre audience fills out cards
giving their comments and indicating their favorites for the
picture version of "Growing Pains," a special word of greeting to some new listeners.'" (Advertising for sponsor follows; announcements as to producer, director and music.)
[2] The problem of similarity between two compositions,
whether literary, musical or dramatic, is a question of fact
to be determined ultimately by a comparison of the two works
upon the basis of the opinion of the average individual possessing a practical understanding of the subject. Although
the majority of the decided cases involved a questioned infringement of a copyrighted work, it would seem that the test
of whether or not an infringement existed would be the same
as the question here involved-the determination of whether
or not such similarity exists between plaintiff's and defendant's programs as to suggest to the average person the use
by defendant of an idea originating with plaintiff upon proof
of the other elements necessary to enable the plaintiff to recover. The analogy between the hvo is drawn by the court
in De Acosta v. Brown, 146 Fed.2d 408.
The parties have conceded that the applicable sections of
the Civil Code, 980 ' and 983 2 as they read at the time plain.
'''Seetion 980. The author of any product of the mind, whether it is
an invention, or n eomposition in letters or art, or a design, with or
without delineation, or other graphical represent.ation, has an exclusive
ownership therein. and in the representation or expression thereof, which
continues so long as the produet and the representations or expressions
thereof made by him remain in his possession."
I " Section 983. If the owner of n product of the mind intentionally
makes it public, a eopy or reproduction Dlay he mad!' puhlic by any
person, without responsibilit1 to the owner, so far as the law of this
atate it concerned."

)

Aug. 1950]

STANLEY V.

COLUMBIA

BROADCASTING SYSTEM

661

£35 C.2d 653; 221 P.2d 73)

tiff's cause of action arose, are but codifications of the common law. [3] The common law right in literary property
and the right existing under the copyright law are contrasted
as follows: .. The term' copyright' is sometimes wsed to designate the property in intellectual productions conferred by the
common law as well as that conferred by statute, the full
pbrase . common-law copyright' being sometimes used. The
justification for this use of the term at tbe present day is
found only in the fact that the common law confers on the
owner of an intellectual production the exclusive right to make
first publication of it, that is, tbe rigbt to copy it in tbe first
instance .
Whether the commOn law ever conferred a
copyright in the sense of an exclusive right of continued
pUblication and sale bas been a matter of doubt and
dispute, . . . but however this may be, the range of rights
and liabilities existing at common law with respect to
intellectual productions is essC'J1tially and greatly different
from those existing under the copyright statutes. BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 [28 S.Ct 722, 52 L.Ed
1086]. Speaking gem·rally. common-law rights are limited to
unpublished works, and all common-law property rights
therein are lost on a publication
while statutory copyrights relate mainly to published works.. . Again, common
law rights ill ullpublished works are of a wider and more
exclusive nature than the rights conferred by statutory copyright in published works. The common law prohibits any
kind of unauthorized interference with, or use of, an unpubished work on the ground of an exclusive property right, and
the common-law right is perpetual, existing until lost or
terminated by the voluntary act of the owner, . . . while a
statutory copyright permits a •fair use' of the copyright publication, without deeming it an infringement. . . . " [Emphasis added.] (18 C.J .S., Copyright and Literary Property,
§ 2, p. 138 et seq.; and cases there cited.)
[4] The test. with respect to infringement, which is laid
down by the C8ses is that impression received by the average
reasonable man upon a comparative reading of the two works
"not by a dissection of sentences and incidents, suitable for
the study of a digest or textbook, but inherently unnatural
for any man who has the kind of brains that make him able
to adapt a work of firtion." (Fra'tlkel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142,
144.) (lfhite-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17
[28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655) ; 13 C.J. 1113, § 276, n. 30; Harold
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Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18; Hewitt v. Coward, 41
N.Y.S.2d 498; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690; Twentieth.
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 i 15
Cornell L.Q. 633, 639.)
[5] In determining whether the similarity which exists
between a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work.
aud an alleged infringing . publication is due to copying, the
common knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator
or listener is the standard of judgment which must be
used. (Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F.Supp. 632;
Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, 39 F.Supp. 683; Barbadillo
v. Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881,885.)
[6a] With respect to the comparison between the two
programs and without unnecessarily "dissecting" them, there
appears to be sufficient similarit;\- to justify the finding of
the jury as the "average, reaSOllll ble man." There are, it is
true, certain dissimilarities which appear: The lack of the
so-called Board of Experts on defendant's program i the fact
that the studio audience only was requested to respond i and
the rather less emphasis which is placed on the reaction of
the public to the play it has heard. The element of prizes
offered for the best letter \vas incorporated into defendant's
program after it had made its first few appearances on the
air and was continued for a period of six weeks. Each case
must be determined on its own facts. (Frankel v. Irwin,
supra.) "It is of course essential to any protection of literary
property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that
the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has
never been the Jaw, but, as soon as literal appropriation
ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large,
so that, as was recently well said by a distinguished judge,
the decisions cannot help much in a new case. Fendler v.
Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 292, 171 N.E. 56." (Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp_, 45 F.2d 119, 121.) "Evidence of these
differences is relevant upon the question of infringement, but ,.
if such differences are shown to exist, the question remains
for the trier of fact to decide the issue." (Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp_, 162 F.2d 354, 361.) (Pellegri-ni v.
Allegrini, D.C., 2 F.2d 610_) "Slight differences and variations
will not serve as a defense." (Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold
Lloyd Corp., supra, 361.) (Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph
A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278; Nutf v. National Institvte Inc. for Imp. of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238.)
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We then have a question of fact-that of the similarity
between the two programs. This question of fact was decided
adversely to defendant by the jury whose duty it was to make
the determination. The rule is settled that this determination
will not be interfered with upon appeal where there is
evidence to sustain it. The evidence, in the form of the two
programs alone, shows that there is substantial similarity to
support the verdict.
Because of the factual dissimilarity between this case and
Golding v. R.E.O. Pictures, Inc., L. A. No. 20699, post, p. 690
[221 P.2d 95], this day decided, the scope of the inquiry
upon the issue of similarity is necessarily different. In each
case the issue of similarity was properly submitted to the
jury. Similarity having been found by the jury, we look to
the evidence to ascertain whether such similarity existed as
to the portion of the production which plaintiff claims to have
originated. In this case it is the entire plan, the grouping
together or arrangement of various elements which constitutes
the claimed infringement. In the Golding case it is only the
plot or basic dramatic core of the play which is claimed to be
original and to have been unlawfully copied by the defendant.
It follows that the inquiry in the Golding case is a more limited
one than that in the present case because of the nature of the
claimed infringement.
[7] The next contention made by the defendant is that the
defendant had no access to plaintiff's program idea. There
is evidence in the record to show that plaintiff submitted his
program to several officials and employees of the broadcasting
company at different times during the years 1942, 1943 and
1944. Implicit in this submission was the belief that if the
program were used he would be compensated therefor. It was
admitted by defendant's witness Hudson at the trial that it
was the custom in the radio industry to pay for such ideas
when and if they were used.
It is conceded by the defendant in its brief that plaintiff's
idea had been reduced to the concrete form of a script format
and recording. [8] The next question to be discussed is
whether or not plaintiff's idea as such was so new and novel
as to be worthy of prot;"'ction. It may be conceded at the outset
that there is nothing new in a play broadcast over the air; it
may also be conceded that there is nothing new in the use oof
the words "Hollywood Preview" in connection with the first
showing to the public of a motion picture; it may also be noted
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that audience participation, as such, is not new to radio. But
when all of these elements are joined to make one idea for a
radio program, it is the combination which is new and now'I.
[9] An author who takes existing materials from sources
common to all writers, arranges and combines them in a new
form, giving them an application unknown before, is entitled
to a copyright, notwithstanding the fact that he may have
borrowed much of his materials and ideas from others, provided they are assembled in a different manner and combined
for a different purpose, and his plan and arrangement are a
real improvement upon existing modes; for the labor of
making these selections, arrangements and combinations has
entailed the exercise of skill, discretion and creative effort.
(Edwards d': Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d
35.) "If the author has accomplished a unique and useful
result through the application of intellectual labor and literary
or artistic skill, his work is entitled to a copyright which will
protect the plan, arrangement and combination of the materials therein, even though all the materials of such work,
or some parts of its plan, or the arrangement and modes of
illustrating the subject matter thereof, may be found separately or in a different form or setting, or in a different
combination in otller distinct works." (Ball, The Law of
Copyright and Literary Property, p. 247.) (Barsha v. MctroGoldwyn-ltlayer, 32 CaI.App.2d 556 [90 P.2d 371].) It has
been previously pointed out that an author's right in the
fruits of his intellectual labor at common law is even broader
than that which he has under the law of copyright.
It was admitted by Hudson, defendant's principal witness,
that prior to the time the program in question was placed on
the air there was no program in which the listening audience
in the studio or the listening audience on the radio were
asked to give their opinions as to the suitability of the
material broadcast by radio for motion picture products. He
further admitted that it was a new idea for the listening
audience, whether studio, or the entire listening public, to
comment on the prospect.ive stars to appear in the proposed
productions. The defendant, however, maintains that its
studio audience participation was merel:' atmosphere and
was not intended to give the public any rea] participation in
the choice of future pictures. If this was the true intention of
defendant, the following exccrpt from the testimony of
Hudson shows that the studio audience was not so advised nor
led to believe:
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"Q. When you first put the program on the air l:itart iug
on May first your studio audience was asked to submit CUlliment first as to whether they thought the material suitable for
pictures, and second, the persons they would like to see in
the leading roles, isn't that right 7 A. That is right."
Thus the evidence shows that defendant's principal witness,
a man who had been in the radio business for some years, beli('ved that a plan such as plaintiff's was new in the sense that
the particular combination of ideas had not before been used
in radio. It is also evident that it was the custom in the
radio industry to pay for such ideas. [10] Furthermore,
the question of originality of plaintiff's program is not one of
law to be determined by the court but is one of fact for the
jury's determination. (Ya.dkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal.App.2d 150,
159 [151 P.2d 906]; Dezendorf v. Twentieth Oentury-Fox
Film Oorp., (C.C.A. 9) 99 F.2d 850, 851; New York Belting
00. v. New Jersey Rubber 00., 137 U.S. 445, 450 [11 8.0t. 193,
34 L.Ed. 741].)
[6b] The next contention made by defendant is that the
jury arbitrarily ignored the uncontradicted, unimpeached
testimony of defendant's witness, Hudson. The record shows
that this witness' testimony was contradicted and impeached
at different times throughout the trial. His testimony with
respect to the so-called program evolved by him in 1940 (before
defendant had access to plaintiff's work) which it is contended is the one broadcast by the defendant company, is
worthy of mention. He testified that the idea back of his program was to promote the sale of stories by authors who could
not get a hearing from important motion picture executives.
He admitted that he had not considered having any audience
participation feature, and, of course, no prize offered for the
best letters, nor had he considered the title "Hollywood Pre- .
view." It would seem that the audience participation feature,
whether the studio audience or the entire listening public,
was one of the more salient parts of plaintiff's program. The
members of the listening, movie-going public, may well have
been sufficiently intrigued with the thought that they were
having a voice in the selection of «« moving pictures of the
future" so as to increase the popularity rating of the program.
There was a great deal of testimony at the trial concerning the
"Hooper" system of ratings. This is a system used to ascertain the number of listeners tuned in to a particular program.
It was also shown at the trial that the percentage of listeners
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increased with respect to this particular program after the
•• prize for the best letter" feature was added. Using the
same test here as to the similarity between the program
actually broadcast and Hudson's program, it would seem that
defendant's contention is without merit. It would not be
apparcnt to the" reasonablc man" upon a comparison of the
two that there was such similarity to raise the inference that
defendant's program was that originated by Hudson in
1940.
[11] Defendant's contention that there can be no liability
to pay for an idea which has been made public is without merit
when the facts of this case are considered. When plaintiff
madc his audition recording before an audience in the National
Broadcasting Company's studio he was not making his idea
"public property" within the meaning of the law. Prior to
publication an author may make copies of his production
and enjoy the benefit of limited or restricted publication without forfeiture of the right of a general publication. The communication of the contents of a work under restriction, known
as a "restricted or limited" publication, is illustrated by performances of a dramatic or musical composition before a select
audience, private circulation of the manuscript, etc. (Ball,
Literary Property and Copyright, 473; Werckmeister v.
American Lithog"aphic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 l69 C.C.A. 553,
68 L.R.A. 591]; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (7
Am.Rep. 480J; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 284 [28 8.Ct. 72. 52 L.Ed. 208] ; Nutt v. National Instttute Inc. for Imp. of Memory, supra; Ferris v. Frohman, 223
U.S. 424 [32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492] ; Uproar Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 358, aff'd, 81 F.2d 373.)
[12] With respect to defendant's motion for a new trial
which was denied by the trial court, various contentions are
made by defendant as to why it should have been granted. First,
it is said that the jury's verdict was so excessive that it must
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
There is evidence in the record to show that plaintiff spent
several years in the preparation of his idea for a radio program;
that he had a recording made of it when the audition was
held which entailed the employment of various screen and
radio actors, technicians and the like. There is evidence to
show that plaintiff's idea was of 110 value whatl'oever to him
after its use by the defendant. As was said in Yadkoe v.
Fields. 66 Cal.App.2d 150, 161 [151 P.2d 906]; "Moreover,
the implied finding that the nature of the material here in-
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volved is such that no value attaches thereto aside from the
thereof, aud that once such material is used the value
therein is gone, is fuBy justified by the evidence . . . . Under
the circumstances here presented, appellant's contention as to
lack of evidence of the value of the use of the material is
without merit." The above quoted case involved the affirmation by the District Court of Appeal of a jury verdict of
$8,000 damages given for the use of isolated" gags." In the
present case, both plaintiff and his expert witness testified as to
the estimated worth of the program idea, and as to the custom
in the industry to pay the author a certain percentage of the
production costs based on the number of weeks a show was
on the air. "The fact that personal property which is injured
or destroyed by the wrongful or negligent act of another, has
no market value, does not restrict the recovery to nominal
damages only; its value or the plaintiff's damages must be
ascertained in some other rational way and from such elements
as are attainable. In such case the proper measure of damages is generally its actual value or its value to the owner.
The value of an article ma~' be shown by proof of such
elements or facts as may exist--such as its cost, the cost of
reproducing or replacing it, its utility and use . . . . " (Universal Pictures Co., v. Harold Lloyd Corp .. 162 F.2d 354, 370,
quoting from 15 Am.Jur. 554, 555.) It would appear that
the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the jury as
to the amount of damages, and that the verdict was not given
under the influence of passion and prejudice.
[13] The newly discovered evidence claimed by defendant
is shown by the affidavit of one James Allen who states that in
1935 he conceived the idea of a radio program on which wonld
appear stories presented in dramatic form to the public as
a "showcase" of possible literary material for the legitimate
stage. This idea was registered with" Billboard," a theatrical
publication in New York City in 1935. In 1939, this idea was
registered with the Screen Writers' Guild under the possible
title, "Play Preview." It contained no element of audience
participation or offer of prizes. The idea back of his program
was to present the st('ries to "the attention of stage and screen
producers" and not to the publie ~enerally. Allen's 19a9
prospectus did not set forth Hny of the details of his idea.
Plaintiff was working for Allen as musical director at that
time, and he states that he made several suggestions with
respect to the program. This is denied by Allen in his
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affidavit. There are affidavits in the record to the effect that
plaintiff had discussed his program idea in 1938 with the
affiants. These affidavits prcsent the same conflict 8S the evidence adduced at the trial. They were before thp court upon
the motion for a new trial. A motion for a new trial on this
ground is to a large extent addressed to the discretion of the
trial judge, and an appellate court will not disturb his rulingunless it is manifest tbat a gross or unmistakable abuse of
discretion appears. (Kirschbaum v. McCarthy, 5 Cal.2d 191
[54 P.2d 8) ; Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal.2d 504 [42 P.2d 59] ;
Buckhantz v. R. G. Hamilton Co., 71 Cal.App.2d 777 (l63
P.2d 756]; JJontaldo v. Hires Bottling Co., 59 Cal.App.2d
642 [J39 P.2d 6661). It cannot be said that there was such
an abuse of discretion in the present case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
The problem in this case is to me a closer one and more
difficult of solution than that presented in Golding v. R.K.O.
Pictures, Inc., post, p. 690 [221 P.2d 95]. In Golding there
is no substantial similarity between the two works except possibly in thf' so-called "central core," which, in this decade, as
I have shown (post, p. 710), is no more novel or original
than (on a claim of like date) the Star Spangled Banner.
But here there is cognizable similarity or deducible relationship between every substantial element of the program which
defendant produceo and that which was proposed by plaintiff.
Likewise, the evidence shows ample opportunity for piracy.
The sole controlling question then is one of fitness for literary
protectibility of that which was pirated.
The problem here is more difficult than in Golding because
here we are in a newer field; all of its vistas have been by
no means explored. The merc)landise offered for sale in this
case-and asserted)y appropriated-is of a quite different
character from that involved in Golding. The craft of storyplotting, together with the art of story-telling, has come down
through the centuries. and legislatures and courts long have
experimented with affording a measure of monopolistic' or
property-right protectibility to literary compositions of conventional nature even though all plotted stories, it is said,
must be but an application of one or more of "The ThirtySix Dramatic Situations." (Georges Polti.) Although original
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plots (dramatic situations) were exhausted centuries ago,
original and novel ideas for handling old plots seem inexhaustible, and as long as sufficient originality in treatment or
handling of the old plot appears the law endeavors to afford
property protection.
In Golding, where the details and whole treatment of plaintiffs' play and defendant's picture are essentially different,
and where the only possibly cognizable similarity is in the
so-called "central core" or "basic plot," we can turn to a
plot catalog and it becomes immediately obvious that no property right of plaintiffs has been appropriated in The Ghost
Ship. But here, as above indicated, the problem and its
solution are not so simple; the answer cannot as yet, I think,
be found in a catalog nor even in the law books.
The plaintiff here did not write a story or a play. He does
not claim originality in the handling of any dramatic plot.
He does claim to have originated a plan for a radio program,
and to have written and recorded the formal script for the
proposed program. Such a plan, together with its script, if
truly original, may constitute a protectible "product of the
mind" (see Civ. Code, § 980). Tbe plan, together with the
script as formulated by plaintiff, has been set forth fully in
the majority opinion and is largely again quoted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Traynor; it need not be repeated
here. Suffice it to say that such plan proposed this version
of the "theatre of the air" type of weekly program: Recognized plays-at least plays which had already been produced
or scheduled for production in motion picture form-would
not be used; instead, sketches or scenarios which the author
was offering for motion picture use would be adapted for radio
presentation; the special announcer or "producer" for the
radio presentation would be a prominent picture figure; he
would ask the radio audience to send in their opinions of the
show with particular reference as to whether they would like
a motion picture version and their ideas for casting the parts;
a cash prizc would be awarded each week to the author of
the "best letter"; the program would be denominated " _ __
[the producer] Presents" and, gencrically, it was referred to
as a "Hollywood Preview" or "Preview Parade." Plaintiff
does not claim to have himself authored any play offered for
use on the proposed program.
Several years after the plaintiff's plan was submitted to
defendant it (in 1945) produced a program entitled "Holly-
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wood Preview." Like plaintiff's plan it embodied a theatreof-the-air type presentation "of a motion picture of the fu·
ture" with announcements pertaining to the production by
an "eminent star of radio, stage and screen"; the studio
audiences were requested to "fin out cards giving their com·
ments" on the proposed picture production and" suggesting
their favorite stars for the motion picture." Likewise, the
defendant in connection with the program it produced, announced a six-weeks prize-contest for best letters relating to
the program in which letters, it was suggested, the listeners
should" express their opinion of the stories' previewed' " and
"vote for the stories they would like to see on the screen."
The perYasive over-all similarity between plaintiff's program-pIan and that used by defendant is patent; the evidence
establishes (under rules which historically have governed
appellate courts) that plaintiff submitted his plan to defend·
ant and that there was opportunity to appropriate it. The
jury, under proper instructions, impliedly found that it was
appropriated with an implied promise to pay its reasonable
value. The basic question for us then, as I view it, is this:
Is the plan as presented by plaintiff such an original product of
the mind as to be legally the subject of private ownership T
If it is, and if a protectible element of it has been appropriated
by defendant, the verdict must stand; if not, the defendant
is entitled to judgment.
A fair answer to such critical question requires this further
factual analysis. No single basic element of plaintiff's program can be said to be novel or to have originated with him;
all such elements had been used before. Plaintiff, however,
did suggest what appears to have been a novel adaptation and
application of the audience participation idea-its adaptation
and application, theoretically, to aid producers in the selection
of stories for picture production. The real object of the audience participation technique is, of course, an appeal to the
interest of the listeners. This program, it would seem, was
devised to appeal particularly to "movie fans," to win their
radio program attention through catering to their motion
picture interest. Upon the record it cannot be held that this
particular application of the audience participation appeal,
as it was dressed up and treated by plaintiff, was not originated by him nor that its admittedly somewhat varied and
limited use in the program produred by defendant was so
unsubstantial as to be legally negligible.
The learned and careful trial judge painstakingly explained
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to the jury that •• Any person is free to use matters in the

public domain as sources of literary or dramatic property
but no person . . . is free to use the composition of another
if such composition involves a new arrangement, combination
or treatment of matters in the public domain, although such
matters by themselves might not be protectible." He further
told the jury that "in order to return a verdict for plaintiff,
the radio program idea which plaintiff expressed in writing
and recorded, or some feature thereof, must have been new,
novel and original. An abstract idea cannot be the subject
matter of an implied agreement to purchase but if such abstract idea is reduced to concrete form, it may in such form be
made the subject of such an agreement to the extent that
the concrete form of such idea is new, novel and original."
Lastly, in this connection, it is to be noted that the jury were
told; "You should determine, first [italics added], whether
plaintiff's idea could be the subject matter of such an agreement; secondly, whether the facts justify your finding that
there was any such implied agreement; and, thirdly, whether
defendant copied or appropriated from plaintiff any portion
of plaintiff's idea which is found to be a proper subject matter
of such an agreement"; and he cautioned tbe jury, "If you
find similarities between plaintiff's program . . . and defendant's program . . . you must determine, first, wbether any
of such similarities are in ideas or features or combinations
thereof which are new, novel or original, and, secondly,
whether, if any such similarities exist such similarities were
appropriated by defendant from plaintiff's program or, on
the other hand, whether they were originated by employees of
defendant or were secured from sources other than plaintiff's
program. Unless you are convinced . . . that there are such
similarities between the two programs and that such similarities are a result of defendant's use of plaintiff's program rather
than origination and development by employees of defendant
or from the use of other sources, your verdict must be for the
defendant . . . Independent creation of identical ideas is not
a basis for liability. In order that a verdict can be returned
against defendant there must have been copying or appropriation from plaintiff."
It is difficult to conceive how the jury could have been more
clearly or adequately instructed on the applicable law. The
question as to whether, on the law as declared by the trial
judg-p. tIl{' f'yidenp(' admits of thr tinnings made by the jury
is admittedly a close one. But where, as .bere, there is an
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el(!ment of originality in plaintiff's program and there is some
similarity between every element of plaintiff's program and
that which defendant produced, and where plaintiff's program was submitted to defendant and the jury has found,
on the instructions quoted, that defendant copied and appropriated plaintiff's program, including an original element
thereof, in the construction of the one it produced, and further
found the implied promise to pay the value of that which it
appropriated, it seems to me that we should breach a fundamental principle of trial by jury were we to hold that the
evidence does not support the verdict. In other words, I
think that the dissenting view in this case rests not on a pure
question of law nor on a total lack of evidence but, necessarily,
on an analysis of the evidence which argues its weight. I do
not think that because the element of originality in the combination of free ideas is comparatively small, we can hold that
as a matter of law the composition is wholly unprotectible.
Obedient, then, to the principle declared in such cases as
Oardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 00. (1947), 330 U.S. 469 [67
8.Ct. 801, 807, 91 L.Ed. ]028) ; Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad
00. (1947), 329 U.S. 649, 653 [67 8. Ct. 598, 600, 91 L.Ed.
572, 576]; Eagles v. United States ex ,.el. Samuels (1946),
329 U.S. 304, 317 [67 8.Ct. 313, 320, 91 L.Ed. 308, 317];
Estate of Bristol (1943),23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689];
Oate v. Oe,.tain-teed P,.od. 00. (1943), 23 Cal.2d 444, 448
[144 P.2d 335) ; Estate of Teel (1944), 25 Cal.2d 520, 526
[154 P.2d 384); Fackrell v. Oity of San Diego (1945), 26
Cal.2d 196, 207 [157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.R. 625]; Viner v.
Untrecht (1945), 26 Ca1.2d 261, 267 [158 P.2d 3]; Pewitt
v. Riley (1945),27 Ca1.2d 310, 316 [163 P.2d 873] ; De Young
v. De Young (1946), 27 Ca1.2d 521, 526 [165 P.2d 457];
Millsap v. National Funding Oorp. (1944), 66 Cal.App.2d
658, 665 [152 P.2d 634] ; S01tthern Oalif. F,.eight Lines v.
State Bd. of Equalization (1945),72 Cal.App.2d 26, 29 [163
P.2d 776] ; Berry v. Ohaplin (1946), 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 663
[169 P.2d 442] ; Medina v. Van Camp Sea Food 00. (1946),
75 Cal.App.2d 551, 556 [171 P.2d 445) ; Seidenberg v. George
(1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 306, 308 [172 P.2d 891], the verdict
should be sustained.
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment of
affirmance.
TRAYNOR, J, Dissenting.-Abstract ideas are common
property freely available to all. What men forge out of th., !
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ideas with skill, industry, and imaginntion, into concrete forms
uniquely their own, the law protects as private property. It
gives the special form the stamp of recognition; it does so to
stimulate creative activity. It does something more to stimulate creative activity: it assures all men free utilization of
abstract ideas in the process of crystallizing them in fresh
forms. For creativeness thrives on freedom; men find new
implications in old ideas when they range with open minds
through open fields. They would indeed be stifled in their
efforts to create forms worth protecting, if in the common
through which they ranged they were diverted from their
course by one enclosure after another. "We must take care
to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial: The one
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits and the reward of their ingenuit~, aDd labor; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded. The act that secures copyrights to authors guards against the piracy of the words and
sentiments, but does not prohibit writing on the same subjeet. "
(Lord Mansfield, in Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361, 101 Eng.Rep.
140.)
It would be ironic if copyright law, designed to encourage
creative activity, became the instrument of its destruction.
The very function of creative activity is to keep the common
field in continuous germination; it is not for copyright law to
render it barren by a succession of enclosures denying access
to those who would cultivate it. "The object of copyright is to
promote science and the useful arts. If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expression of certain
ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions
from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each
copyright would narrow the field of thought open for development and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative, and
dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would be
hindered by copyright, instead of being promoted. A poem
consists of words, expressing conceptions of words or lines of
thoughts; but copyright in the poem gives no monopoly in the
separate words, or in the ideas, conception, or facts expressed
or described by the words. A copyright extends only to the
arrangement of the words. A copyright does not give a monopoly in any incident in a play. Other authors have a right to
35 C.1d-1&2
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exploit the facts, experiences, field of thought, and general
ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form,
in which the circumstances and ideas have been developed,
arranged and put into shape." (Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404,
408-409; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121;
Balmes v. Burst, 174 U.S. 82 [19 8.0t. 606, 43 L.Ed. 904].)
To insure free trade in ideas, therefore, the monopoly created
by copyright is limited to "the arrangement and combination
of the ideas . . . the form, sequence and manner in which
the combination expresses the ideas." (Bowen v. Yankee
Network, Inc., 46 F.Supp. 62, 64.)
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea
by copyright does not prevent its protection by contract.
Even though an idea is not property subject to exclusive
ownership, its disclosure may be of substantial benefit to the
person to whom it is disclosed. That disclosure may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay. (Bristol v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264,267 [30 N.E. 506, 28
Am.St.Rep. 568] ; Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685, 686.)
Unlike a copyright, a contract creates no monopoly; it is
effective only between the contracting parties; it does not
withdraw the idea from general circulation. Any person not
a party to the contract is free to use the idea without
restriction.
Even though the idea disclosed may be "widely known and
generally understood" (Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356
Mo. 435 [202 S.W. 2d 7, 13], it may be protected by an express
contract providing that it will be paid for regardless of its
lack of novelty. (Brunner v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo.
1225, 1237 [181 S.W.2d 643] ; High v. Trade Union CouNr
Pub. Corp., 69 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 529.) An implied-in-fact contract differs from an express contract only in that the promise
is not expressed in language but implied from the promisor's
conduct. (Yadkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal.App.2d 150,158 [151 P.2d
906] ; Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 .
Wash. 600, 603 [55 P.2d 1053, 104 A.L.R. 1353]; Cole v.
Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App.Div. 116 [28 N.Y.S.2d 404,
409].) It is not a reasonable assumption, however, in the
absence of an express promise, or unequivocal conduct from
which one can be implied, that one would obligate himself to
pay for an idea that he would otherwise be free to use. E~en
an express contract to pay for "valuable informlltion" to be
submitted by the plaintiff does not carry the im~lication of a
'Promise to pay if it is found upon disclosure to be common
i
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knowledge. (Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
R. Co., 95 Conn. 702. 708 [112 A. 639].) If the idea is not
noyel, the evidence must establish that the promisor agreed
expressly or impliedly to pay for the idea whether or not it
was novel. (Masline v. New York, New Ilaven ~ Hartford
R. Co., supra ; Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 235 N.Y. 609 [139 N.E.
754].)
The gravamen ot plaintiff's cause of action is not the unauthorized use of his idea, since ideas may be freely borrowed,
but the breach of an agreement to pay for its use. If the
evidence discloses that there is no express or implied-in-fact
contract there can be no recovery. (Bristol v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264, 267 [30 N.E. 506. 28 Am.St.Rep.
568) ; Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486 [23
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894]; Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 62, 63-64.) It is urged that even in the absence of
express or implied contract, recovery may be predicated upon
a quasi contract, or implied-in-law promise to pay the reasonable value of the idea if it is used. Quasi-contractual liability,
however, is based, not upon an;\' evidence of consensual agreement but in the absence of such agreement, upon the theory
that the defendant would be unjustly enriched if he were
allowed to use the idea without paying for it. A defendant
who makes use of an abstract idea that is common property is
not unjustly enriched thereby, since he has taken nothing to
which the plaintiff or any other person has the right of
exclusive ownership. Gh'en the principle that abstract ideas
are free, there is no more right to recovery for their use in
an action in quasi contract than in an action for infringement
of copyright. It has been consistently beld that an action in
quasi contract for the nse of an idea is governed by the same
principles that control a tort action for copyright infringement: the idea must be embodied in a concrete form attributable to plaintiff's own ingenuity (Baile1l v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co .• 193 Misc. 723 185 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52) ; Bowen
v. Yankee Network,lnc., 46 F.Supp. 62.63; Thomas v. R.J.
Reynold.~ Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262. 267 f38 A.2d 61. 157
A.L.R. 14321; Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529, 539,
aff'd. 43 F.2d 685.688), and the form af; dif;tin~uished from
th" abstrart idra mnst be used br thE' dt'fendant. (Matarese
v. Moore-1I1cCormack T.ines. Inc .. 158 F.2d 631. 634; Plus
Promotions, Inc., ". R.C.A. Mfg. Co .• 49 F.Supp. 116, 117;
Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962, 969.) In either
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case the plaintiff must prove that property was taken that was
his. His choice of alternative actions is analogous to that of
a plaintiff whose personal property has been converted and
who may elect between a tort action for the value of the
converted property and an action based upon an implied-in.
law contract to pay the reasonable value of its use. The
plaintiff's election will govern the nature of his recovery, but
it does not affect the basic elements of his caus!: of action.
(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Ca1.2d 495, 498-499 [71 P.2d 258] ;
Los Angeles Drug Co., v. Superior Court, 8 Ca1.2d 71, 74 [63
P.2d 1124] ; Hallidie v. Enginger, 175 Cal. 505,508 [166 P.1];
Corey v. Struve, 170 Cal. 170, 172 [149 P. 48] ; Bechtel v.
Chase, 156 Cal. 707, 711 [106 P. 81].)
Plaintiff developed a script and format embodying his idea
for a radio program based upon the production of radio plays
in a Hollywood setting. Had defendant appropriated the
concrete form in which the idea was expressed, the' 'literary or
artistic creation available for advertising use or otherwise"
(WtLliamson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 258 App. Div. 226 [16
N.Y.S.2d 217]), plaintiff would have a cause of action for
infringement of his common law copyright in the development
of the idea that he had conceived. (Civ. Code, § 980; Barsha v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 32 Cal.App.2d 556, 561
[90 P.2d 371] ; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 54.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that there could be
no recovery if this action were one in tort for copyright
infringement and that he was properly nonsuited as to his
cause of action based thereon, presumably because there was
no appropriation of whatever craftsmanship gave concrete
form to his program idea. For the same reason there could be
no recovery in quasi contract. Plaintiff can only recover upon
an implied-in-fact agreement that defendant would pay him
the reasonable value of his idea.
Plaintiff's second cause of action, upon which the judgment
in his favor rests, was based upon the allegation that he
submitted his program idea to defendant's agents "at said
defendant's special instance and request . . . under and
pursuant to an implied agreement that if said defendant used
plaintiff's said radio program or any part or portion ~hereof,
that said defendant would pay to plaintiff the reasonable value
thereof." There is substantial evidence to support the allegation that defendant accepted plaintiff's submission of his program idea with knowledge that he expected to be compensated for its use under an implied agreement that he would be
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paid for the idea if it proved to be commercially valuable
and was in fact used by the defendant.l The evidence does
not, however, furnish support for an inference that defendant
agreed to pay for the use of the idea even though it might
prove to be •• common or even open to public knowledge. " (High
v. Trade Union Oourier Pub. Oorp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529.)
Such a promise cannot reason a bly be implied from the
practice of the radio industry.2 Admittedly, the industry is
'Plaintiff testHled to bis conl'ersation with RullS Jobnson, then pro·
gram director of KNX, defendant's station for tbe Los Angeles area:
., 1 think 1 caned bim on the telephone for an appointment and told
him 1 had a recording. and a format and a script on what I thought
was a new and a good radio idl'a. and be asked nie to bring it to bis
office. 1 brought it to his offiee. and when I got it there he told me he
was very busy at the time and would 1 please leal'e the recording. and
the script and the format with him for about a week or 10 days. or
at the outside two weeks. and that he would listen to me m the mterim
and give me his opinion as to what he thought of it, and if the Columbia Broadcasting System or it~ ~lIles department could sell it."
Hal Hudson, defendant's westel'D program director, also testified
to his conversation with Ben Paley. defendant's progranl operationl
manager:
"Q. Did Mr. Paley ever Dlention to you the fact that Stanley had a
program'
.. A. Yes. At some iater date I believe be told me that Mr. Stanley
had a program entitled Walter Wanger Presents.
"Q. Well, can you fix the date of t11at statement that Mr. Paley made
to you'
"A. Only that it undoubtedly was after May 16, 1943 beeauae before
that time I had no responsibilities toward new programs. My duties were
concerned with programs ou the air.
"Q. Wh .. ; did Mr. Paley tell you about this program Walter Wanger
Presents'
, • A. He told me ouly that Stanley, wbom 1 had previoualy met, had
such a program .
•• Q. Did be tell you what it was about?
.. A. No, he didn't.
.. Q. What was the occasion of his mentioning it to you? What did
he say'
"A. I think he said m effect, • Stanley bas a program Walter Wanl!;er
Presents which 1 would like to have you hear.'
•• Q. Did be ten you it concel'Ded the broadcast of stories written for
motion pictures'
"A. No. He told me nothing about it. He said. 'I thmk it is a pretty
good program.' ,.
-rbe testimony of Hudson, uJlon which plaintiff relies, demonstrates
the willingness of the industry to pay for ideas of commercial value but
furnishes no support for any inference tbat it would agree to pay for
common and backneyed ideas:
.
.. Q. Now, Mr. HUdson. is tllI.')·P any reeognized right in the radio
field t.o an original pro!!,ram idclI'
.. A. It seems to me that i~ A point of law whieh 1 am not qualified
to answer.
• «Q. You are not familiar with the practices of the blduatry 10 far
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willing to pay for new ideas of commercial value to it, but
there is no basis for an inference that a national radio network
would agr('(' to pay for the U!i(' of an idea, regardless of whether
it is novel or t;hopwol'll, hacluwyeu, and commonplace. .. A
duty not to use an idea alr(·ady known cannot be created
by virtue of the fact that one lIIa);:es a confidential disclosure of
that idea." (Smoley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 24 l<'.Supp. 294,
300, aff'd. 106 F.2d 314.) Plaintiff's recognition that novelty
is essential to the marketability of a radio program· idea is
implicit in his statement to Johnson that he had "what I
thought was a new and a good radio idea." Defendant's
policy is set forth in a standard form, of which plaintiff was
aware, that all persons who submit program ideas for consideration were requested to sign.a In that form, Columbia
unequivocally disclaimed any intention to pay for the use of
a non-novel idea. Its willingness to consider plaintiff's program idea was in accord with that policy. The evidence does
not indicate any intention on defendant's part to deviate
therefrom. It must therefore be held that plaintiff submitted
bis program idea to defendant upon the latter's implied-in-fact
promise to pay him the reasonable value of the idea if it should
prove to be novel and commercially valuable and if defendant
should put it to use.
the recognition of program ideas are concerned, or payment therefor?
• • A. I am familiar with the practice, yes. .
"Q. Now, ia there BUch a thing aa recognition iD the radio iDd1l8tl'7
of a radio program idea'
"A. Yes.

&8

"Q. By MlL FENDLER: Is there any practice iD the zadio iDdustl'7
on the part of broadeaating companies to pay for the reasonable value
of radio program ideas apart from services'
"A. Ideas which they have contracted for'
•• Q. Which they have contracted for or used.
"A. Which they have contracted for, yes.
"Q. As a matter of fact, the broadcasting companies request the lub·
miasion of program ideaa, do they not'
"A. I wouldn't say they solicit them. They accept them.
•• Q. And they accept them upon the buia that if they are 1II8d,. they
wID be paid for?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Is that right!
"A. Yes.
"Q. And that is well tmderstood iD the iDd1l8tr7. _" "that eorreeU
"A. Yes."
... To Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
"I am submitting my idea, summarized or eharacterizedbe1ow, about
a radio program to you today with the understanding that you are wholly
free to determine questions of priority and originality ia eoaneetion
wWl ally icleRti.eal 01' nb8tantially aimilar Mleaa • • ."
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This appeal thus presents two questions for the decision of
this court:
(1) Is plaintiff's radio program or any part thereof novel
and commercially valuable T
(2) Is there similarity between plaintiff's idea and defendant's radio program with respect to any novel aspects of
the former to support an inference that defendant made UDauthorized use of plaintiff's idea'
1
Plaintiff testified that the basic idea of his program, for the
use of which he claimed a reimbursement of $100,000, was to
give the people of America "a voice in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in the years to come." His idea took the
form of a proposed weekly radio program entitled "Walter
Wanger Presents," "Preview Parade," or "Hollywood Preview," which was to present a play that might be suitable for
motion picture production. The listening public was to be
encouraged to write letters, by an offer of prizes for the best,
commenting upon the motion picture value of the plays and
suggesting stars for the leading roles; it was thus to have a
voice in selecting stories and stars for motion pictures.
Virtually none of the elements of the proposed program to
give the public a voice in this selection is novel. There is nothing
novel in the idt'a of linking dramatized stories on the radio
with the glamour of Hollywood. The following programs,
broadcast nationally, were also based upon this idea: "Lux
Theater of the Air," "Hollywood Star Time," "Screen Guild
Theater," "Hollywood Premiere." "Hollywood Playtime,"
"Hollywood Players," "This is Hollywood."
There is nothing novel about plaintiff's title "Hollywood
Preview." There was uncontradicted testimony that during
the period defendant's program was broadcast, another program with the same title was broadcast locally over other
stations. Moreover, these words have long been associated with
the previews of Hollywood motion pictures. notably at
Grauman's Chinese Theater and at the Carthay Circle Theater.
To the millions of movie-conscious persons at whom all these
programs are aimed. the title has becomt' generic and descriptive, symbolizing the glamour associated with Hollywood.
the bright lights, the mi11ing throngs waiting for a glimpse
of tht' celt'brities attending a tirst showing of a motion picture ..
"Thert' can be no property in words which are merely generic
or descriptive." (Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film

)
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Corp.,82 Cal.App.2d 796, 808 [187 P.2d 474].) That this title
is generic or descriptive is clearly indicated by plaintiff's use
of it in the script of his proposed program, not as its title (the
proposed title was "Walter Wanger Presents"), but as a descriptive term, indicating the first performance of a proposed
motion picture. In giving their program this title, defendants
appropriated nothing in which plaintiff could claim a property
interest.
There is nothing novel in the idea of listener participation in
a radio program. Radio has long been glutted with programs
in which listeners are importuned to participate. Thus
listeners on the Jack Benny program were importuned to submit letters on the topic "I hate J a ('I, Benny because-. "
Listeners on the progran. entitled "The Shadow" were importuned to relate in a hundred words or less why they use
Camay Soap. Listeners on the program entitled" Listeners'
Digest" were importuned to write on what they considered the
outstanding radio entertainment they had heard in the preceding week.
There is nothing novel in the idea of giving prizes to radio
listeners for best letters. The idea of giving prizes for best
letters is an ancient one in advertisin~.
There is nothing novel in the idea of soliciting the comments
of listeners as to whether a radio program merits commercial
presentation. Thus the Major Bowes program solicited the
comment of listeners on the amateurs on the program with the
object of determining whether they should receive professional engagements.
There is nothing novel about the following elements or
their combination with the foregoinl-! features of plaintiff's
program: repetition and emphasis of the title throughout the
broadcast. introduction of the master of ceremonies. by the
announcer, a master of ceremonies prominent in the motion
picture industry, announcement of the title of the play to be
presented and tIle stars therein, and announcement of the
author of the pla;v. These dements have for years been a
part of almost every program fell turing radio stories with a
Hollywood connection. Defendant, as well as plaintiff, may
nse these elements freel~' either singly or in combination. (See,
Orn.~fein ~. Paramollnt Productions, l'I1c .. 9 F.Supp. 896, 901.)
It may br possible' to combinr sllch hacknryro elements so
imagilllltiwly that the~' comprif;r a novel program idea, or
to gi"e them a new twist that places them in tIl(> catefron' of
fresh material. A new twist to a worn idea may be as much

)
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entitled to credit as an entirely new idea. "No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed
by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are,
more or less, a combination of what other men have thought
and expressed. . . . " (Emerson v. Davies, Fed.Cas. 4, 436,
8 Fed.Cas. 615, 618.) "Presenting old material in a new plan
or arrangement is sufficient to lend copyrightability to the resulting work." (Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, 86;
Universal Pictures Co. v. HaroZfJ. Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354,
363; Edwards ct Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15
F .2d 35, 36.) Two architects may originate very different
designs for the same structure, specifying the use of identical
materials; each has a property interest in his design. Similarly writers may create original stories out of the same problem, as Anatole France created "Thais," Somerset Maugham,
"Miss Thompson" ("Rain"), and Andre Gide, "Symphonie
Pastorale. " And in the literature of music there are many
creative variations by one great composer on the themes of
another.
Plaintiff has made no unique combination or interpretation
of old material. Whatever novelty there may be in his program lies in a fresh variation of the listener participation idea,
a variation of the idea in the Major Bowes program of having
the listeners participate in determining whether amateur
artists should become professionals. Although the evidence
demonstrates that previous to the presentation of plaintiff's
program to defendant there was no radio program in which
the listeners participated in determining the selection of
stories and stars for motion pictures, there is a question
whetherplaintift' has conceived a variation of the listener
participation idea substantial enough to warrant a claim to
novelty, Novelty of ideas in radio programs must be assessed
in the light of the fact that many programs are commonplace
presentations of commonplace materials. Inevitably ideas in
this field may have a claim to novelty by virtue of their
attention-getting possibilities, even though they lack the brilliance commonly associated with creative thought. A fresh
application of the familiar, however dull or commonplace it
may appear to the critical, may be a marketable idea if it
gives enough promise of winning the attention of the public.
It is not for the court to consider the quality of an idea or tl>
pass judgment on the public's taste; the problem before it is
not one of aesthetics but of property rights. (B1.eUtein v.

)
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Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251·252 [23 S.Ct.
298, 47 L.Ed. 460].) On the other hand, in the fertile field
of commonplaceness there is also a propagation of ideas whos '
claims to novelty are spurious, for whatever value they rna.
have rests not on their uniqueness but on their resemblance t
the familiar. The value of a fresh application of an idea that
has thrived on repetition may lie. not in the application, but
in the familiar idea itself. The secret of success of such pro
grams as plaintiff's seems to be listener participation. and;
since listener participation has already been used for such
a variety of purposes, it is open to question whether its appli.,
cation to plaintiff's purpose is imaginative enough to compel
one to say that something new has been added, that there has
been a variation of the old that in some measure transforms
it. (See, Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F.Supp. 816, 818.)
II
Whatever the validity of plaintiff's claim to novelty for his
application of the listener participation idea, it constitutes his
only claim to novelty, and defendant is not liable if it did not
use that application.
There can be no finding that defendant used plaintiff's
program idea without proof that it had access thereto.
(Twentieth Century.Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d
893, 894, cert.den. 329 U.S. 716 [67 S.Ct. 46, 91 L.Ed. 621J ;
Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 608,610.) Access is established
by proof that employees of defendant read or heard plaintiff's
program before or in the course of the development of defend·
ant's program. (Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560.) It
is undisputed that before defendant's program was broadcast,
the employees of defendant had read and considered the
script, recording, and format submitted to them by plaintiff.
There was a conftict in the evidence as to whether Hudson.
defendant's western program director, developed defendant's
program before plaintiff submitted his idea. The jury re·,
solved that conflict against the defendant. Proof of oppor-'
tunity to use plaintiff's idea, however, does not compel
affirmance of the judgment without proof that defendant
availed itself of that opportunity. (Kustol/ v. Chaplin. supra;'
Cain v. Universal Pictures Corp., 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1015.)
Direct proof of use is seldom available. If there is proof of
access. however, copying may be inferred from similarity be·
tween the two programs with rpspp('t to the feature of plaintiff's idea, which it will be a8sumed for the purpose of this
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dissent was novel, the application of listener participation to
the determination of a story's suitability for motion pictures.
1t must therefore be determined whether there is such a
similarity between the two programs. Mere general similarity that proceeds not from the novelty of plaintiff's idea but
from its commonplaceness is irrelevant. Only sillJilarity with
respect to what is novel in plaintiff's idea is relevant. (Booth
v. Stutz Motor Oar 00., 56 F.2d 962, 969; Sacu-Lowell Shops v.
Reynolds, 141 F.2d 587, 593; Plus Promotion.~, Inc. v. R.O.A.
Mffl. 00., 49 F.Supp. 116. 117.) The staudards that govern
this inquiry are the same as those governing tbe question
whether there is relevant similarity between two productions
to support a finding of copying in a suit for copyright infringement. When a plaintiff claims the protection of common law or statutoQ' copyright for his literary effort, that
protection extends only to any originality of treatment or
expression that is copyri~htable. When a plaintiff claims
the protection of an implied-in-fact contract for an abstract
idea, his idea must bave the characteristic of novelty for which
defendant has promised to pay. In both cases, only similarity
appearing between the two works with respect to that which
is protected in plaintiff's work is relevant. General similarity
in nonprotectible elements. being irrelevant, cannot support
an inference of copying in a piracy suit or use in a suit upon
a contract. (Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 17;
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655, 662; Shipman v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures Oorp., 100 F.2d 533, 537; Rosen v.
Loew's, Inc., 162 F.2d 785, 788.)
'rhe majority opinion bolds that the jury's finding will he
upheld on appeal if "such similarity exists between plaintiff's
and defendant's prugrams as to suggest to the average person
the use by defendant of an idea originating with plaintiff. . . .
In determining whet.hef the similarity which exists between
a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work and an
alleged infringing publication is due to copying, the common
knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator or
listener is the standard of judgment which must be used. . . .
The evidence, in the form of the two programs alone, shows
that there is snbstantial similal'ity to support the verdict."
This statement assumes that a general similarity between the
two programs justifies submitting to the jury the issue of use.
Recovery can be allowed, however, only if there is similarity
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between the programs with respect to the novel aspects of
plaintiff's program.
The majority opinion holds that plaintiff has met this
requirement by introducing evidence that his program contains a novel idea. OHee he has done this, the mere fact of
introduction of the two programs into evidence is enough to
an ow the case to go to tll!? jury and to support a verdict
reached thereon. TlJe jury compares the programs as an
average listener would. If it receives the impression from its
common knowlf'dge that there is similarity between the two
programs, this impression and common knowledge support the
inference that defendant used plaintiff's program idea, and
defendant is liable for the reasonable vahle thereof. The jury
may determine that defendant must pay therefor, even though
it is evident that plaintiff's protectible property interest in
his program comprises onl~' a small part thereof, and even
thoug-h it is evident from a comparison of the two programs
that there is no similarity between them in regard to the
novel idea of plaintiff's program. Such a procedure may
have the prejudicial effect of supporting a charge of piracy
even thongh substantial similarity between two programs
resnlts from the use in both of stock situations or standardized
techniqnes long used in the radio industry and therefore in
the public domain. (See. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65
F.2d 1. ]7. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529. 536;
Echet~arria v Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F.Supp. 632. 635;
18 C.J.S. 231.) It is therE'fore of the grcatest importance to
narrow the issue of similarity. If the jury is permitted to
reach its verdict on the basis of a general comparison of the
programs in their entirety. there is great risk that similarity
between the programs in their commonplace aspects will be
weighed to defendant's disad,"antage and that plaintiff will be
permitted rf'imbursement for the non-noyel elements of his
program idea, for which defendant did not ag-ree to pay. If
a J(eneral similarity ma~' of itsf'lf support a yerdict in plaintiff's favor an appel1at~ ('omt wonld be powerless to afford
relief from such a verdict. pven thOllg"h the onl~' similarit~'
is between th(' non-noyel elements containE'o in both programs.
Tlle error inhE'rent in the s('ope of inquiry pr('scribed by the
majority opinion is not ObVllltpd b:v itR concession that, once
the jury haR rt'tnrnpd a "prdict for plaintiff that may havE:'
bf'en based on irr('leYant g"!?neral similarity. "we 100), to the
('vidence to as;certain whetller sueh similarity existed as to the
portion of the production which plaintiff claims to have
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originated." We thus have the anomalous situation in which
a case must first be submitted to the jury and a verdict returned for the plaintiff before the court can determine whether
the case should have been submitted to the jury.
Such a result is not supported by the weight of ease
authority. In Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1,
plaintiff sought to enjoin the exhibition of a motion picture
by the defendant on the ground that it constituted an infringement of a magazine story previollsly published by the plaintiff. Admittedly there was substantial similarity in plot and
in several isolated comedy sequences, and on this basis, the
trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the
judgment, stating that an examination of the two scripts
revealed no similarity in those elements of plaintiff's production that were the product of his own ingenuity and creative
talent. In discussing the fact that plaintiff relied upon
admitted similarities in basic elements of each production, the
court stated:
"In the case at bar, if it be assumed that there are such
similarities between the story and the playas to provoke in
the casual observer the consciousness that there is such a
similarity between them, and that eopying may be inferred
therefrom, we are still confronted with the fact that mere
similarity does not necessarily involve literary piracy or an
infringement of a copyright. Such similarities then as exist
would require further analysis to determine whether or not
they are novel in the story and thus copyrightable. The copyright of a story only covers what is new and novel in it, 80
that the question of infringement involves a consideration of
what is new and novel in the story to which the author bas
acquired a monopoly which has been misappropriated by
another . . . 'It should also be borne steadfastly in mind, that
if a work is not entirely original, there is no copyright in the
unoriginal part, which wi11 prevent its use, separately, or in
combination, with matter not covered by copyright. Hence,
of course, any inquiry as to infringement must exclude permismole reproduction of such non-original matter.'" (65 F.2d
23-24.)
In Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also reversed a trial court verdict
for the plaintiff that had been reached upon ndmitted Rimilarity in non-originaJ elements of the two productions. In
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stating that infringement could not be established by cutting
and trimming down to basic themes and concepts, the court
stated: "This incomplete skeleton the two plays have in com·
mOll, but it is with real difficulty that the flesh and bloou,
the incidental, yet essential adornment anu trimming, of the
plays can be cut away to show similarity between a few bones.
This difficulty is fatal to plaintiff's case . . . the copying
which is infringement must be something . . . recognized as
having been takell from the work of another." (11 F .2d 692.
See also Twentieth Oentury-Fox Film Oorp. v. Dieckhaus.
153 F.2d 893; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Oorp., 45 F.2d
119; Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142; Oain v. Universal Pictures Oorp., 47 F. Supp. 1013.)
It follows that the issue before this court is not, as the
majority opinion holds, whether there is substantial similarity
between the two programs, but whether there is evidence of
substantial similarity between the two programs with respect
to plaintiff's novel idea to justify submitting the case to the
jury. That issue can be determined only by the comparison of
the two radio scripts whose contents are not disputed. Such
a comparison will reveal whether there is relevant similarity
between them. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict
raised the issue whether there was such similarity. If there
was no evidence of such similarity, then no proper inference
of copying could be drawn, and the trial court should not
have let the case go to the jury on the basis of the general
similarity between the two programs. In denying the motion
for a directed verdict, the trial court committed reversible
error. (Hewitt v. Ooward, 180 Misc. 1065 [41 N.Y.S.2d 498,
500] ; Soy Food Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 161 F.2d
22,25; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Oorp., 45 F.2d 119, 122;
Wiren v. Shubert Theatre Oorp., 5 F.Supp. 358, 362; Becker
v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 894; Dorsey v. Old Surety Life
Ins. 00., 98 F.2d 872, 874 [119 A.L.R. 1250]; Barbadillo v.
Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881, 885; Eastern Wine Oorp. v. WinslowWarren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 960; Oalifornia Fruit Growers
Exch. v. Sunkist Baking 00., 166 F.2d 971, 973; Kaeser ~
Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Assn., Inc., 64 F.2d 575, 576; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 426, subd. 3.)
The cases relied upon by the majority indicate that only
when there is evidence of relevant similarity to support an
inference of copying is the question of copying submitted to
the jury. (Universal Pictures Oorp. V. Harold Lloyd Oorp.,
162 F.2d 354, 363; Fendler V. Moroseo, 253 N.Y. 281, 287 [171
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N.E. 56); Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp.,
32 Cal.App.2d 556, 561 [90 P .2d 371].) In reversing the
judgment, this court would not be substituting its judgment
for that of thE' jury, as the majority opinion suggests, but
would be determining that there was insufficient evidence to
support the implied finding that there was similarity between
the two programs with respect to plaintiff's novel idea.
Plaintiff's program was based on the idea, in his own words
"the most important idea in my show," that it would afford the
public a "voice in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in
the years to come." This idea is emphasized in virtually every
paragraph of the program: "Wanger: How do you do,
ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to our Hollywood Preview
Parade, a radio show designed for your pleasure and to give
you a vwce in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in the
months to come. Hollywood is very interested in giving you
motion pictures you want to see. Unfortunately producers
do not and cannot always know just what you do want. This is
the reason for this I Preview Parade.' Each week we plan to
present a radio story we think will make a good film. We ask
you to send us your opinion and suggest players for the leading roles. Our sponsor will give worthwhile cash prizes for
the best letters, but more about that later.
"Of the five stories we have so far presented this series,
three will be made into motion pictures largly because of your
voting . ...
"Boardman: . . . Each week Mr. Wanger selects a story
which he feels should be made into a picture. You are asked
to write to Mr. Wanger and give him your opinion. The
sponsors pay $500 for the best letter written by one of our
listeners and if enough of you vote for it our play 1IJ1,"lZ be
produced as a motion picture.
"Wanger: . . . 'So Gallantly Gleaming' tells a thrilling
and romantic story . . . . Listen closely. Do you think it
should be made into a motion picturet Your votes will decide.
"Boardman: . . . Now again a word as to the real idea
behind this program. Each week Walter Wanger Presents
brings you a story which we think would be a good motion
picture. And here is your part in the program. We ask you
to write to Mr. Wanger, telling him whether or not you would
like to have this play made into a motion picture, and why.
Also include your choice of stars to play the leading roles. The
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best letter received each week will receive an award of $500
from our sponsor . . . . And believe me, Hollywood is waiting
for your vote. Whether or not you win a prize, your vote
wt1l help decide whether or not to film 'So Gallantly Gleaming.' The American picture-going public has long said it
wished a voice in the choice of stories presented on the screen.
Here is the chance for you to have that voice and make it heard
across the nation. . ..
"Last week Mr. Wanger presented 'Out of the Night.' .••
A storm of argument was aroused. 68,000 letters have been
received to date, and we are happy to announce that Warner
Brothers Studio have arranged to make this startling story
into a film in the near future. So, thanks to your letters, you
have helped Warner Brothers to their decis1'on to film lOut of
the Night.' ...
"Wanger: . . . Thank you, [board of experts] . . . Do
you, ladies and gentlemen, agree with the opinions of our
guests T Do you agree that 'So Gallantly Gleaming' should
become a motion picture'! And who do you think should play
the leading roles T Won't you write and tell us. Remember
that whether your letter is best and wins the prize or not, you
are helping Hollywood decide on what to give you on the
screen.. ." (Italics added.)
It is apparent from defendant's programs that their basic
idea was to simulate the "first showing of a new motion picture in the film capitol" and thereby to capture in its "radio
version of [a] Hollywood Preview," the "same spirit of enthusiasm," to make its listeners feel they were viewing that
glamorous event. The programs were described as a "Hollywood Preview of a motion picture of the future," as a preview of a "new story written especially for the screen," and
"now scheduled for production" or "now in preparation"
at one of the motion picture studios. The public was to be
given "a glimpse into the movies of tomorrow" but nobody
at any time was asked to influence their selection. The studio
audience was requested to ., ffill] out cards giving their comments" on the play and "suggesting their favorite stars for
the motion picture" for the purpose of giving a Hollywood
atmosphere by adapting to a broadrast of motion pictures
"previewed" on the air, the custom of hAving the motion
picture audience fill out preview cards. There was no intimation that the reaction of the studio audience would in
any way infiuenre the production of the picture. In contrast
the radio audience comments solicited in plaintiff's program
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were not for thl~ purpose of atmosphere; they were indispensable to his idea of giving the public a voice in the selection
of motion pictures to be filmed. On August 21, 1945, defendant announced that a contest awarding prizes for best letters
would be staged for a six-weeks perioli j that listeners would
thus be given "a chance to express their opinion of the
stories they would like to see on the screen." Defendant's
contest was the time-honored advertising scheme used to increase sales of the sponsor's gasoline. To participate, listeners
had to get entry blanks from the sponsor's service stations.
The contest, lasting only six weeks, was an incident of the
program, not its core. Defendant's program did not, in its
contest feature, or otherwise, give the listening public the
impression that" if enough of [the listeners] vote for it [the]
play would be produced as a motion picture." It was specifically announced on defendant's programs that a "motion
picture of the future" was being presented: on three programs
it was stated that the plays were in production.
A comparison of defendant's program with the application
in plaintiff's program of the listener participation idea, makes
it clear that defendant did not in any of its programs copy
that idea. There is a fundamental difference between the
themes of the two programs. The basic idea of plaintiff's
program was listener participation in the selection of stories
and stars for motion picture production in the future. The
ba..,ic idea of defendant's programs was listener participation
in the simulation of whatever glamour attends a Hollywood
preview. If there is kinship between the two programs, it
rests on their common capitalization of Hollywood glamour_
But defendant stops short of executing plaintiff's idea that
the public might do more than behold the glamour that spells
Hollywood by participating in determining by what and by
whom it should be bedazzled.
Spence, J 0, concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 31,
1950. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.

